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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) treats its members very differently; some of 
the countries that borrow from the Fund receive huge loans while others in similar 
circumstances receive smaller loans. In this article, I argue that the difference in 
treatment is determined largely by domestic political conflict in the IMF’s most 
powerful member-states. My contention is that the IMF offers governments bigger 
loans when interest groups in the G-5 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Japan) pressure their governments into achieving this outcome. While 
domestic political processes in the G-5 drive government policy towards the IMF, 
governments must also bargain with one another on the international stage if they are 
to influence IMF policy. With few exceptions, most previous research has tended to 
‘black box’ the intergovernmental aspect of this process. In this article, I set out and 
test a novel explanation of how governments arrive at collective decisions through a 
system of logrolling. By illustrating the sources of variation in IMF lending, this article 
contributes to our understanding of power and decision-making in international 
organizations. Moreover, it also provides an insight into the causes of the recent surge 
in the IMF’s lending activity since the onset of the global financial crisis. 
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 1 
For many years, leading scholars in international relations have been calling 
for more detailed empirical research on international organizations (IOs). 
The consensus is that empirical research has not kept pace with the 
development of more sophisticated theories of international cooperation 
(Martin and Frieden 2003; Milner 2005; Goldstein et al. 2007; Hafner-
Burton et al. 2008). IMF lending to developing and emerging markets is a 
case in point. Although the Fund’s lending activity is the subject of intense 
scrutiny and debate, important questions remain as to how the states that 
govern the IMF reach collective decisions over policies. A look back at 
some recent cases reveals a lot of variation. For example, Brazil (27 billion 
SDRs in 2002) and Turkey (12 billion SDRs in 2002) received generous 
loans only a few years ago, while others like Russia (4 billion SDRs in 1995) 
and Mexico (3 billion SDRs in 1999) received much smaller loans.  
Why is it that countries like Brazil and Turkey received huge loans while 
others in seemingly similar circumstances received smaller loans? The 
conventional explanation is that IMF decisions are responsive to both 
political and economic pressures. More specifically, many scholars stress that 
IMF policies consistently reflect U.S. interests and are not merely 
technocratic decisions (Kahler 1990; Thacker 1999; Stone 2002; Oatley and 
Yackee 2004; Andersen et al. 2006; Woods 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007; 
Stone 2008). By contrast, other scholars emphasize the independent role of 
the IMF’s bureaucracy (Vaubel 1996; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Willett 2000; 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2008). While most studies have 
converged on one of these two positions, few look to the role of the other 
powerful states that govern the organization.1 This is puzzling considering 
the United States has only one representative, holding 16.7% of the votes, 
on the organization’s 24-member Executive Board. But what do 
governments want out of the IMF’s lending policy? And how do they 
bargain and cooperate to get what they want? With few exceptions, most 
previous research has tended to ‘black box’ the negotiation and bargaining 
process that occurs among governments and the IMF’s professional staff. 
This is not surprising; voting rarely occurs in individual lending cases. Our 
knowledge is also hindered somewhat by the secretive nature of the 
decision-making process but this is not unusual in international negotiations 
where the stakes are high.2  
In this paper, I argue that variation in IMF lending can be best explained by 
domestic political conflict in a group of the IMF’s most powerful member-
states. My contention is that the IMF offers governments bigger loans when 
interest groups in the G-5 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Japan) pressure their governments into achieving this 
outcome. While domestic political processes in the G-5 drive government 
policy towards the IMF, governments must also bargain with one another 
on the international stage if they are to influence policy. In this paper, I set 
out an explanation of how governments arrive at collective decisions 
through a system of logrolling.  
In what follows, I set out a theoretical framework that illustrates the 
domestic sources of governments’ foreign economic policies towards the 
                                                 
1
 For two recent reviews of the literature see (Vreeland 2007) and (Steinwand 
and Stone 2007). Also a notable exception to this trend is (Copelovitch 2010) 
who also examines G-5 interests and IMF policies. 
2
 The same can also be said of other international organizations. According to 
Martin and Simmons, the majority of empirical studies on IO decision-
making tend to focus on observable voting behaviour, leaving a gap in our 
knowledge of decision-making in IO’s that rarely vote (Martin and Simmons 
1998).  
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IMF and then examines how governments respond to the domestic actors 
that demand IO policy change. I then proceed to examine the inner-
workings of the IMF and how these shape international bargaining and 
decision-making. After setting out a general theory of IMF decision-making, 
I then test the observable implications of this theory in a quantitative 
analysis of IMF lending to 159 countries from 1983-2006. 
 
The domestic political economy of IMF lending 
One of the most important developments over the last few decades is the 
rapid increase in international economic exchange. The explosion of cross 
border transactions has already had a profound effect on domestic politics 
within countries. Increasingly, in the words of Milner and Keohane, ‘we can 
no longer understand politics within countries – what we still conventionally 
call “domestic politics” – without comprehending the nature of the linkages 
between national economies’ (Milner and Keohane 1996:3). In this section, I 
set out an explanation of how changing economic linkages drive societal 
groups in the IMF’s most powerful member states to seek IMF financing for 
developing and emerging markets. My explanation starts with an economic 
shock in a developing or emerging market that triggers societal groups in 
other countries to take action to limit their actual or potential losses. One of 
the many strategies a societal group should consider is to lobby for IMF 
finance in the expectation that some of it will be diverted back to them. In 
order to employ this strategy, however, a societal group must be able to 
wield influence in domestic politics. Although many groups potentially fit 
this criterion, I argue that the only groups strong enough to influence 
government preferences over IMF loans are banks and exporters. 
The other societal groups that might benefit from IMF financing will find it 
difficult to access to the ‘IMF strategy’. Individual investors, for example, 
face many difficulties recouping their losses from sovereign defaults. Being 
too numerous and diverse, they face severe collective action problems that 
limit their ability to lobby governments. Individual investors are also shorter 
lived and less visible in international politics than banks or firms.3 One 
visible outcome of their failure to act collectively is that they possess few 
formal institutions through which they can coordinate their actions as a 
group or engage in negotiations with debtors. One only needs to consider 
the history of bond financing, which is littered with failed attempts to form 
institutions to recoup losses, to see that this class of actor has achieved little 
success in mobilising for political action (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
2007:ch1). Much of the same can also be said for taxpayers. Each taxpayer 
stands to gain in a very small way from additional IMF financing but will 
find organizing for collective action even more challenging than an investor. 
At the firm level, the story is different. Banks are in a better position to seize 
the opportunity provided by IMF financing because they are fewer in 
number than individual investors. Their smaller numbers make it easier for 
them to exercise political influence.4 Banks benefit from IMF financing 
when a recipient government re-directs it to them. For example, the terms 
of Ghana’s 1983 IMF program stipulated that Ghana’s loan would be 
deposited in the Bank of England from where it would be directly 
transferred to Standard Chartered Bank to repay a short-term loan (Gould 
2006b:156).  
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 There is also little empirical evidence that IMF financing has ever gone 
towards bailing out bondholders (Roubini and Setser 2004:13) 
4
 See (Tomz 2007:197) for why banks can punish more effectively than 
bondholders. Although in this paper, punishment is not the outcome of 
interest. 
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Exporters are the other relevant interest group that should prefer more IMF 
financing to offset their losses. Economic shocks hurt exporters by reducing 
the demand for foreign imports in an afflicted country, and sometimes when 
they increase the competitiveness of an afflicted country’s exports. A 
generous IMF program can help to take some of the pain associated with an 
economic shock. In particular, an IMF program can support the public 
sector in a developing or emerging market, many of which import a lot of 
foreign goods and services. Therefore, exporters that supply governments 
will be the first to benefit from additional IMF financing because it allows 
governments to continue to purchase, and reduces the likelihood of 
governments defaulting on payments for goods and services already 
supplied. That exporters lobby their governments to offset losses is already 
well established in the political economy of trade (Dür 2010). It is also 
reasonable to expect that exporters should seek IMF financing where they 
face both a loss of their market share, and a loss of profits due to a reduced 
demand for goods and services and/or government default on the payment 
for goods or services already supplied.  
Apart from IMF financing, the other options available to both banks and 
exporters include reducing their exposure to a troubled country and bilateral 
or multilateral negotiations to recover outstanding debt. Indeed, reducing 
exposure is a popular strategy; capital flight and financial crises are highly 
correlated. The same is also true of trade which predictably collapses in the 
years following a Paris Club agreement to reschedule or restructure 
sovereign debt (Rose 2005). While reducing exposure is a popular strategy, 
negotiation with the debtor is much less desirable. This is because private 
cooperation to reschedule debt is complicated by the number of actors 
involved, the diversity of financial assets, and the variation in exposure of 
the actors involved (Lipson 1985:203). Although collective action to recover 
debt is difficult, bilateral or multilateral talks with the debtor are possible if a 
country has unmanageable debt that it must restructure. Private creditors 
(whether banks or exporters) can offer to postpone principal payments, 
inject new capital to keep interest payments current, or offer to reschedule 
debt. Although rarely successful, private creditors can also use the threat of 
commercial sanctions (particularly trade sanctions) to limit their losses 
(Tomz 2007:195).  
Private cooperation is even more difficult when governments enter the 
formal debt restructuring process through the Paris Club and Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. In a formal restructuring arrangement, 
private actors are at the bottom of the creditor hierarchy in terms of their 
ability to recover debt.5 Their lack of seniority means they can become 
crowded-out in the process. By contrast, the IMF and other multilateral 
development banks are at the top of the creditor hierarchy. International 
institutions like these are almost risk-free lenders that borrowers must repay. 
Next in line are bilateral lending agencies - mostly export credit agencies 
financing by their governments - whose debts are easier to recover because 
they are publically guaranteed by debtor governments.6 After the public 
creditors represented by the Paris Club seize the opportunity to recover 
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 The formal process is coordinated via the Paris Club. While it sets out rules 
and norms for restructuring sovereign debt, negotiations are on an ad hoc 
basis (Rieffel 2003). More advanced attempts at cooperation through 
international institutions, such as the IMF’s recent SDRM initiative have 
failed (Krueger 2002). 
6
 For a more detailed discussion of debt restructuring and the seniority of 
sovereign debts see (Roubini and Setser 2004:249-288) and (Rieffel 2003)  
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their debts, the commercial banks represented by the London Club7 or Bank 
Advisory Committee are the next in line to receive treatment. Finally, bond 
investors and suppliers are the last to receive treatment in the process. 
Suppliers, including exporters, are the least likely to receive anything from a 
default or restructuring but sometimes their goods and services are insured 
against sovereign default through export credits.  
In summary, banks, bondholders, and exporters are all lower in the creditor 
hierarchy and must negotiate through different mechanisms to recover debt. 
Debt recovery is a difficult process taking years and often yielding nothing. 
International cooperation among debtors and creditors is difficult to achieve 
and the formal debt restructuring is not ideal for banks or bondholders, as 
they are not priority creditors. With the odds stacked against them, this 
leaves interest groups in the G-5 that have lost, or expect to loose from an 
economic shock, with little other option but to look towards their own 
government for assistance. By lobbying, they can pressure their government 
into extending additional IMF finance to a troubled country, some of which 
can then be diverted back to them. 
 
Government preferences and IMF lending 
So far I have outlined how a deteriorating economy in a foreign country can 
hurt domestic interest groups, encouraging them to lobby to limit their 
actual or potential losses. My argument is that interest groups organise 
primarily at the firm level to lobby governments over IMF programs, and 
should use their resources to shape government preferences inline with their 
aggregate exposure in a foreign country. But will the exposure of domestic 
interests ultimately lead to government action? 
At the international level, governments have few other venues to turn to but 
the IMF. The other possible strategy involves the use of taxpayers’ money. 
In some situations governments will subsidise banks and exporters directly. 
In others, government will orchestrate a bilateral or multilateral loan to 
‘bailout’ a country on the verge of default, or experiencing some form of 
economic crisis. From the vantage point of a government, however, these 
options are less desirable. IMF financing involves no direct transfer of 
money from taxpayers, making it the most attractive option for 
governments that possess the means and motivation to align the 
organisation’s policy with their preferences. Many scholars see this as an 
inherent flaw in the international financial architecture. For example, former 
First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, commented 
that: 
 
‘We lack incentives to help countries with unsustainable debts resolve them promptly and 
in an orderly way. At present the only available mechanism requires the international 
community to bail out the private creditors.’ (Krueger 2001) 
 
Although many scholars understand the nature of this problem and have 
suggested possible solutions, there are few systematic explanations of the 
political consequences that follow from its existence.8 My argument is that 
interest groups are aware of this gap in the international financial 
architecture and will use their resources in order to exploit it. To gain access 
to the ‘IMF strategy’, interest groups can employ different types of resources 
to influence government policy including money, legitimacy, political 
support, knowledge, expertise, and information (Dür 2008:1214). 
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 This organisation is similar to the Paris Club but it is even more informal as 
it dissolves after every meeting (Rieffel 2003:2-3) 
8
 See (Eichengreen 2003; Krueger 2002) on how to reform debt 
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Governments will often respond favourably to lobbying because banks and 
exporters have structural importance, constraining the extent to which 
governments and politicians can act against their interests. The structural 
importance argument is based on the insight that the state is structurally 
dependent on capital; governments tend to dislike policies that hurt business 
interests because they are dependent on the private sector to provide 
revenue for the state (Wallerstein and Przeworski 1988).  
To influence government policy towards the IMF, interest groups must 
evaluate the utility of pursuing different strategies. Adopting any strategy to 
recover debt will entail costs – expenditure on information, knowledge, 
lobbying, and more. Private financial institutions and some firms have 
advanced models of risk management and should be rational actors in this 
regard, selecting the most efficient method of recovering debt, reducing 
exposure, and lobbying governments and international organisations. As a 
group, they already cooperate to limit their financial losses through debt 
securitisation and insurance.  
Governments too must evaluate the utility of the different strategies at their 
disposal. As a group, they collectively benefit from good IMF policies that 
stabilise economies, prevent the disruption of trade and capital flows, and 
reduce the risk of ‘contagion’ where a financial crisis in one country spreads 
to others. In return for the provision of international public goods, 
governments contribute to the IMF’s pool of currency. The primary cost 
that arises for governments is the ‘opportunity cost’ of membership: to 
continue as a member a government must not withdraw its IMF quota and 
divert it to some other use. Added to the opportunity cost of membership, 
is the possibility that the organisation will not always deliver the goods; 
capture by powerful countries or special interests may well prevent the 
organisation from delivering. Politicians that represent citizens who benefit 
disproportionately from international economic integration should accept 
these potential costs in return for the potential benefits.  
Considering both the costs and benefits associated with the IMF, does it 
follow that governments will always support socially optimal IMF programs? 
Unfortunately, governments often lack the incentive to do so because a 
socially optimal program might only marginally benefit its constituents. 
Because voters are uninformed or apathetic about international financial 
rescues, they do not always hold governments accountable for their success 
or failure to support good IMF policies. Information asymmetries also make 
it difficult for governments to be informed about every international 
financial rescue. This is one of the reasons why the task was delegated to the 
IMF’s staff in the first place. In contrast, governments will often support a 
policy that is sub-optimal at the global level in order to cater to a narrow 
segment of society because it benefits disproportionately from IMF 
financing. Governments will support banks and exporters when the cost of 
not doing so exceeds the gains from their investment in the IMF, both in 
terms of their holding of SDRs in the common pool of resources, and in 
terms of the gains from the international public goods that the institution 
provides. 
Nevertheless, there are still limits to how far a government can influence 
Fund policy even when it is clearly in their interest to do so. If the 
organisation was to lend too freely without concern for the risks involved it 
would damage its reputation, increase moral hazard, and deplete its limited 
resources. To avoid this, the IMF’s member governments must strike a 
balance between the provision of liquidity and the prevention of moral 
hazard (Copelovitch 2010:53). Providing liquidity allows debtors to continue 
to service their loans. Keeping debtors liquid also has a pacifying effect on 
the international financial system by preventing the spread of a financial 
 6 
crisis to other countries. If the IMF lends more than is necessary, however, 
it creates ‘moral hazard’ where both private investors and recipient 
governments might act recklessly without sufficient concern for risk. IMF 
insurance alters their expectations, as they do not have to suffer all of the 
consequences of their actions, leading to the possibility that IMF financing 
could increase the likelihood of a financial crisis occurring in the first place. 
Therefore, subject to all of these constraints, governments must make the 
trade-off between marginally increasing the income of the global citizen 
(through the provision of international public goods and protection of their 
investment in these goods) and significantly improving the income of 
interest groups. The balance will often tip towards policies that fail to deliver 
socially optimal IMF programs when the costs of doing so outweigh the 
benefits. 
 
International bargaining: exercising influence at 
the IMF 
The final step in my theory is to describe the IMF’s internal decision-making 
process whereby governments bargain and cooperate with one another on 
the international stage to influence the organisation’s output. Governments 
do so officially through the IMF’s Executive Board, which sits in a 
continuous session, overseeing and influencing the direction of Fund policy. 
Although it is clear that governments wield influence over IMF policy, how 
governments reach collective decisions in each specific case is still widely 
debated.9 At first glance it appears that governments are not in control of 
this process: the IMF’s Executive Board rarely rejects a proposal from the 
staff, giving the impression that the staff are firmly in control of policy-
making. This is unlikely, however, as the repeated nature of their interaction 
means that voting is not necessary for governments to wield influence. 
Instead, it is more likely that governments and their officials exercise 
influence through informal channels. By threatening to reject a policy or 
taking punitive action in another policy area, governments can limit staff 
autonomy. The relationship between governments and staff, therefore, is a 
classic principal-agent problem. Several authors have analysed this 
relationship with reference to the IMF, and all reach the same basic 
conclusion: both staff and membership exercise some influence over the 
policy process with variation in the level of influence across different 
policies (Copelovitch 2010; Martin 2006; Stone 2008; Gould 2006a). 
Throughout the paper, I have argued that only the G-5 governments are 
capable of systematically influencing IMF lending policy.10 Although there 
are many reasons underlying the G-5’s commanding position at the IMF’s 
Executive Board, I do not provide a thorough explanation of the origins of 
their power and influence in this paper.11 Rather, I posit an explanation that 
sees the G-5 cooperate through a system of logrolling to influence high-level 
                                                 
9
 Some scholars have attempted to explain this through voting power indices; 
however, these do not take a position on the preferences or strategic 
behaviour of the various actors in the decision-making process (Alonso-
Meijide and Bowles 2005; Dreyer and Schotter 1980; Lane and Berg 1999; 
Lane and Maeland 2006; Leech 2002; Leech 2005; Reynaud and Vauday 
2007) 
10
 While the G-5 is in a commanding position when it comes to high-level 
policies like program approval, lending, and conditionality, it is likely that 
the staff and other members have influence over other IMF policies.  
11
 The view that the G-5 and G-7 control IMF policies is supported by a 
number of other authors (Rieffel 2003; Fratianni and Pattison 2004; 
Copelovitch 2008) 
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decisions. This explanation is based on the group’s voting power12 and the 
IMF’s constitution and institutional design, which are clearly biased in their 
favour. 
Logrolling in this context means that a member of the G-5 will support a 
generous IMF loan for a country where their domestic interests are exposed 
to risk and loss. To gain support for their position, they will also support 
generous loans for other members of the G-5. In this way, a member of the 
group with little economic exposure will still support a large loan for 
another member in the expectation that the favour will be returned. In the 
long run, this favour-trading process should skew IMF lending and program 
approval decisions to the benefit of the G-5. As the exposure of the most 
exposed member of the group increases, so should loan size, and the 
likelihood of program approval. By cooperating in this way, the group can 
avoid conflict over every case that presents itself before the IMF’s Executive 
Board and ensure that the benefits accruing from IMF lending are 
oversupplied in the cases where a member of the group’s economic 
exposure is greater. 
Logrolling processes like the one I describe frequently occur in domestic 
politics. As far back as the 1950s, scholars recognised that they are more or 
less likely depending on the strategic and institutional setting that legislators 
inhabit (Tullock 1959). Despite many advances in the study of legislative 
behaviour since then, there are still large gaps in our knowledge of how 
these sorts of processes play out in international settings like the IMF’s 
Executive Board. A reasonable assumption is that international legislators 
should act similarly to their domestic counterparts when they are subject to 
the same constraints and incentives. But when applying this logic to the 
IMF’s Executive Board, what specific aspects of its constitution and 
institutional design support logrolling among the G-5? According to 
Carrubba and Volden, it is easier to maintain cooperative coalitions for 
logrolls where: ‘the number of legislators is small, the bills are much more beneficial 
than costly, the future is highly valued, the probability of re-election is high, coalitions can 
be formed quickly and easily, and voting rules are less inclusive’ (Carrubba and 
Volden 2000:265). All of these points fit the constitution and institutional 
design of the IMF very closely. There are only 24 Executive Directors. Bills 
(or IMF programs in this context) are much more beneficial than costly. 
Besides the considerable potential benefits that I have already outlined, there 
are few risks, as repayment is virtually guaranteed, making IMF loans much 
more secure than typical bank loans. The future is also highly valued: no G-
5 government can know the time, location, or magnitude of the next 
financial crisis or the extent to which their domestic constituents could 
benefit from a more generous IMF loan. Re-election is also guaranteed: only 
G-5 representatives are appointed without election. Added to this, the 
voting rules are not inclusive; 161 of the IMF’s 185 members delegate their 
voting power to an official from another member state. All else being equal, 
the bargaining dynamic in this environment clearly tends towards logrolling: 
members of the G-5 allow loans that are more generous where a G-5 
government has a strong interest in a particular case. In return, other G-5 
governments can expect the same treatment if they have a strong interest in 
the future. 
 
To summarize, I have outlined the domestic political processes that lead G-
5 governments to respond to the economic exposure of domestic interest 
groups. I have also outlined how these governments cooperate through a 
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 As a bloc, they control 38.37% of the votes in the organisation, giving 
them the ability to veto most decisions. 
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system of logrolling to distribute the benefits of IMF financing. Taking both 
into consideration leads to the following testable hypotheses, which should 
hold even after controlling for alternative explanations: 
 
The higher the economic exposure of the most exposed G-5 member:  
 
a) The more likely that the IMF will approve a program 
b) The higher the IMF loan 
 
 
Data and operationalization 
To test the hypotheses I have collected data on 159 developing and 
emerging economies between 1983 and 2006, resulting in a dataset of 3816 
country-years, 535 of which led to an IMF program. The data are the most 
comprehensive on IMF lending and program approval to date, covering 
more countries, years, and program types than previous studies.  
IMF programs come in two varieties: concessional and non-concessional. 
Transition economies and emerging markets generally enter non-
concessional programs such as the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF). In the 1980s, the IMF introduced the first 
concessional arrangement – the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and 
later the Extended SAF (ESAF) which was renamed the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999. Concessional loans come with lower 
interest rates and repayments are rescheduled over a longer time. Currently, 
78 low-income countries are eligible for PRGF assistance based on a cut-off 
point of $1095 (per capita income, 2007).  
With few exceptions, previous quantitative studies have focused on only one 
type of program. According to my argument, however, truncating the 
sample in this way is unnecessary. Even when the IMF lends at a 
concession, members of the G-5 can still benefit because all loans have 
distributional consequences. Furthermore, all IMF programs are subject to 
the same decision-making process – there is no separate process at the 
IMF’s Executive Board for approving concessional programs – and 
therefore no reason why the same political actors should behave differently. 
 
Model specification 
IMF lending is best theorised as a two-stage process where the initial 
decision to approve a program dominates the subsequent decision over the 
size of a loan. In other words, the size of an IMF loan, which is the outcome 
of interest in this study, is not an independent decision. Fitting a statistical 
model to this reality calls for a two-stage model that takes account of the 
dominance of the first stage. The Heckman selection model best fits this 
problem because it models a two-stage process starting with selection and 
continuing with a subsequent decision over a continuous outcome. In 
addition, it will allow me to test both hypotheses set out in the paper while 
also controlling for selection on observed and unobserved variables. 
 
Heckman’s procedure starts with an equation that describes a linear 
relationship: 
 
IMF loan = β0 + β1 etc… + u1 
 
The dependent variable, IMF loan, is only observed according to a selection 
equation, where the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value 
of ‘1’ when an IMF program is approved and ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
 9 
γ0 + γ1 etc… + u2 > 0 
 
Where   u1 ~ N (0, σ) 
  u2 ~ N (0, 1)  
  corr (u1, u2) = ρ  
 
The error terms, u1 and u2, have correlation ρ. The value for ρ is a measure 
of the selection effect, and is reported as rho. Rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the unobserved factors that determine selection into an 
IMF program and the unobserved factors that determine the size of the 
IMF loan. The intuition here is straightforward: if the unobserved factors 
that influence IMF program approval are correlated with the unobserved 
factors that influence loan size, selection bias is likely to be a problem. 
Although the two-stage logic of the Heckman selection model is appropriate 
here, the model performs poorly without an exclusion restriction. An 
exclusion restriction is a variable that enters the selection equation but does 
not enter the outcome equation. Scholars in international relations are often 
confronted with this problem when theory dictates that identical variables 
should enter both the selection and outcome equation. In the majority of 
cases where this issue has arisen, scholars have either dropped an 
explanatory variable from the outcome equation or included an additional 
variable in the selection equation. However, this course of action has been 
widely debated in social science, and the consensus is that it is best avoided 
(Sartori 2003; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; Madden 2008). Without an 
exclusion restriction, the results are based only upon distributional 
assumptions about the residuals and not upon variation in the independent 
variables (Sartori 2003). 
In the statistical analysis, my exclusion restriction is a variable that measures 
a systemic transition in the international system. This variable controls for the 
transition from communism, where a large group of states moved from 
planned economies operating in a relative autonomy to market based 
economies. The inclusion of this variable is justified on theoretical grounds, 
and unlike many other applications of the Heckman selection model, is not 
merely a practical measure to improve model fit. A systemic transition of 
this nature should have an impact on program approval without having an 
impact on loan size.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the IMF’s Systemic 
Transformation Facility was created to relax the higher program approval 
requirements that would have prevented the post-communist countries from 
entering stand-by programs under normal circumstances (Stone 2002). 
Without the collapse of the Soviet Union, I assume that this group of states 
would have continued to have little access to IMF lending. Therefore, a 
systemic change of this nature should influence program approval without 
influencing loan size, making the transition a naturally occurring process that 
can serve as a valid exclusion restriction. Controlling for this transition is 
also important at an empirical level. Without controlling for the transition, it 
would appear that the IMF had much more relaxed program approval 
standards. It would also appear that many countries with similar economic 
systems all entered IMF programs within a very short period, inflating the 
importance of some variables. In the selection equations, systemic transition is 
a binary variable taking the value of ‘1’ where a state is transitioning from 
communism during the years 1991-1993 only.13 
                                                 
13
 Both before and after the transition, program approval should be subject to 
the same political pressures that I outlined in my theory. For example, 
Boughton confirms that Yugoslavia had significant commercial bank 
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The models that I estimate also employ the maximum likelihood estimator 
as opposed to the twostep estimator because it is generally considered to 
perform better (Puhani 2002). Moreover, to control for potential 
heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard errors and clustering at the country 
level so that observations are independent across countries but not within 
countries. Finally, all independent variables were lagged by one year to avoid 
simultaneity and better reflect the time lag in the IMF’s decision-making 
process whereby IMF decisions are influenced by previous, rather than 
current macroeconomic and other data. 
 
Dependent variables 
The first dependent variable is the size of a country’s IMF loan in SDRs 
(Special Drawing Rights) as a share of its IMF quota.14 Weighting the 
dependent variable by a borrowing country’s quota takes account of the 
constraints that the quota system sets on IMF lending. In the early years of 
the IMF, there were strict limits on a country borrowing above its quota but 
these have since been removed (Bird and Rowlands:158). There are now no 
formal limits on borrowing but in the data collected for this paper there 
were only 15 instances from a total of 535 where a country’s loan exceeded 
three times its quota. In addition to its use as a benchmark, the quota system 
also determines voting rights and general SDR allocations. Therefore, 
measuring a loan in proportion to a borrowing country’s quota takes 
account of the constraints on IMF resources and the ability of the 
borrowing country to use influence (in the form of votes) to gain access to 
finance. Any alternative measure of IMF lending will not account for these 
important political economy dimensions. Furthermore, at an operational 
level, the organization and its officials benchmark and compare loans in this 
way (IMF 2009). When actors go to bargain over loan size, it is easier for 
them to do so using this measure than a more complicated one. Apart from 
these compelling reasons to favour this measure over others, it was also 
employed in a recent study (Copelovitch 2010). In summary, if loan size is 
the key variable of interest in a cross-national analysis, taking the ratio of the 
loan to a country’s quota is the measure that best closes the gap between 
concept and indicator. 
The second dependent variable – IMF program approval – is a binary 
variable taking a value of ‘1’ in the year of program approval and ‘0’ 
otherwise. This measure is preferable because it takes account program 
approval, rather than continuation or participation in general. For the 
purposes of this paper, a focus on program approval alone seems 
appropriate and is best understood as a discrete choice that calls for a binary 
variable.   
 
Independent variables 
G-5 economic exposure 
Trade and finance are the principal channels through which domestic 
interests in the G-5 are impacted by economic shocks in developing and 
emerging markets. For each of these channels, I compile separate indices of 
exposure taking only the highest level of exposure from amongst the G-5. 
                                                                                                         
exposure and required IMF assistance at several points when it found it 
difficult to meet its obligations (Boughton 2001). 
14
 SDRs are an international reserve asset best described as potential claims 
on the currencies of the IMF members. Their value is based on a basket of 
major currencies reviewed by the IMF’s Executive Board every five years. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm [Accessed 30 August 2009] 
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For example, in 1983 Afghanistan showed no claims from banks in France, 
the UK, and Japan, 1 million dollars of German claims, and 4 million dollars 
of US claims. In this example, 4 million would enter the index, as it is the 
highest value. By treating the data in this way, the empirical analysis is 
grounded in my theory, which posits that the G-5 engage in logrolling at the 
IMF. 
Data on bank exposure are drawn from the Bank for International 
Settlements. The BIS data represent the consolidated foreign claims of 
reporting banks in millions of US dollars. Absolute values are weighted by a 
G-5 member’s total bank lending before entering the index to normalize 
exposure across countries.  
To measure trade exposure I have collected data on exports to developing 
and emerging economies from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. The 
trade exposure index was compiled in the same manner by taking the 
highest value (as a portion of total exports) from among the G-5. 
In order to test the alternative argument that IMF financing is not brokered 
through logrolling, I include dummy variables that take the value of ‘1’ in 
cases where a member of the G-5 is the most exposed and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Evidence that countries were treated differently would suggest that the way 
in which power and influence are channelled through the IMF is not 
adequately explained in my theory. Therefore, these are good variables for 
testing the explanatory power and robustness of my argument. If my 
argument holds, it should not matter which member of the G-5 is the most 
exposed. Rather, what should matter is the exposure of the most exposed 
member of the group. 
 
Control variables 
In accordance with previous research on the political economy of IMF 
lending I have included several sets of variables to control for alternative 
explanations. First, I include the following macroeconomic variables to 
control for domestic economic conditions in borrowing countries: 
international reserves measured in months of imports, current account balance as a percent 
of GDP, external debt as a percent of GDP, debt service as a percent of GDP, the log of 
GDP per capita, and the GDP growth rate. I also include an additional control 
variable - Financial crisis - to take account of instances where the IMF is 
acting in its traditional role as lender of last resort. This choice of control 
variable is motivated by the literature on financial crises, which shows that 
even countries with strong underlying fundamentals are sometimes 
vulnerable to speculative attacks (Leblang and Satyanath 2006:247). 
Therefore, loan size and program approval may well be crisis-driven and not 
necessarily reflected in the macroeconomic indicators that I outlined above. 
This variable is coded ‘1’ if a country experienced any combination of 
currency, banking, or debt crisis in the year of IMF program approval and 
‘0’ otherwise.  
Second, I include U.S. military aid in millions of dollars in the models to capture 
strategic ties with the United States. This controls for the argument that the 
United States uses its power and influence to favour its allies. I use this 
measure as opposed to US-UN voting affinity, which is popular in the 
literature. My reasoning here is that US-UN voting alignment may be either 
a reward for previous voting or an incentive for future voting. U.S. military 
aid, in contrast, is a more stable and long-term measure of a strategic 
alliances.  
To control for some of the potential bureaucratic influences on IMF loans I 
include a binary variable – IMF quota review - for years where the IMF’s 
membership reviewed the organization’s budget. According to the 
bureaucratic politics’ explanation, in quota review years the IMF’s staff 
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should ‘hurry-up lending’. By depleting its resources in the year of a quota 
review, the Fund can demonstrate to the membership that they should 
increase its budget. This is standard practice in bureaucracies with budget 
cycles – spending and lending should increase at the end of the cycle.  
Finally, to control for the changing relationship between the IMF’s 
professional staff and their political masters, I include an index measuring 
the delegation of authority from governments to the IMF’s bureaucracy. 
Several authors have argued that where the IMF’s staff have more 
autonomy, decisions will more frequently reflect technocratic and 
bureaucratic interests (Copelovitch 2010; Gould 2003). The delegation index 
captures several features of the IMF’s bureaucracy that vary over time: the 
range of services supplied; autonomy in the filling of staff posts; financial 
autonomy; management autonomy; size of budget; and size of staffing. This 
is the most comprehensive measure of the organizational independence 
compiled to date.  
 
Findings 
The results from the Heckman selection models are reported in Table 1 
along with measures of model suitability and selection bias. The first column 
of Table 1 presents the base model including only domestic economic 
conditions and the exclusion restriction. The second column introduces one 
of the main quantities of interest in this paper: the G-5 index of bank 
exposure. The third column builds on this by adding several variables to 
control for financial crises, IMF quota reviews, delegation of authority to the 
IMF, and U.S. military spending. Column 4 presents the results from the full 
model, including control variables for the most exposed lender from among 
the G-5. These were not statistically significant and were dropped from the 
table in order to improve the presentation of the results. Models 5, 6, and 7 
replicate models 2, 3, and 4 but substitute the G-5 index of bank exposure 
with trade exposure, and in the place of the variables to control for bank 
exposure among the G-5 it substitutes variables to control for trade 
exposure. Once again, the trade exposure variables were not statistically 
significant and were dropped from the table to improve presentation. 
The findings from the analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that IMF 
loans and program approval are responsive to an increase in the economic 
exposure of the most exposed member of the G-5. All of the coefficients 
run in the expected direction and the explanatory variables of importance 
for my theory are statistically significant in all of the models. The greater the 
economic exposure of the most exposed member of the G-5, the more 
likely is program approval and a larger loan.  
The variables that control for alternative explanations about the impact of 
individual G-5 members on IMF lending and program approval are not 
statistically significant in any of the specifications, lending little support to 
the argument that it is the identity of the most exposed member of the G-5 
that matters, rather than the actual extent of their economic exposure. In 
other words, it makes no difference to the size of an IMF loan whether the 
most exposed country is the US, UK, Germany, Japan, or France. 
Of the principal macroeconomic variables, GDP growth and the presence 
of a financial crisis are consistent across the specifications. A financial crisis 
in the potential recipient of IMF financing is highly correlated with the 
likelihood of program approval. While this is an intuitive finding that speaks 
to the role of the IMF as an international lender of last resort, that loan size 
is also responsive to financial crises speaks to the political as well as the 
economic pressures on Fund resources. In times of crisis, political pressure 
to lend may well intensify as the potential for losses among G-5 increases, 
and lobbying by domestic interests becomes more urgent.  
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Of the other macroeconomic variables, GDP growth is negatively correlated 
with both program approval and loan size. As economies grow faster, the 
likelihood of program approval diminishes as do the size of loans. An 
increase in international reserves is statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with program approval and loan size in 5 of the 7 models. This is 
also an intuitive finding and supported elsewhere in the literature.  Clearly, 
domestic economic conditions matter to some extent, but the evidence for 
the impact of the other macroeconomic variables appears mixed at best.  
It is surprising that the current account balance is statistically significant in 
only one of the models. It is also surprising that neither debt service nor 
external debt consistently predict program approval or loan size. The latter 
is only significant in models 5, 6, and 7 on the size of IMF loans.  
U.S. military aid is statistically significant in the program approval equation 
of model 4 and the loan size equation of model 6. That it is significant and 
negatively correlated with program approval in model 4 runs in contrary to 
much of the existing literature. Similarly, the level of delegation from 
member states to the IMF staff has little systematic impact on loan size and 
program approval. The evidence on the impact of an IMF quota review is 
also sparse, although, a quota review is correlated with an increase in the 
likelihood of program approval in models 6 and 7. As expected Systemic 
transition is positively and significantly correlated with program approval in 
all but model 4, reflecting the impact that the movement of a large group of 
states from planned to market economies had on the likelihood of program 
approval. 
Although the results from this statistical analysis lend strong support to the 
theory and hypotheses set out in this paper, it is not possible to reject some 
of the alternative explanations of IMF behaviour. Some of these findings do 
confirm what others studies have found: countries are more likely to enter 
into IMF arrangements when they face an economic crisis. More severe 
crises generally lead to bigger loans, holding other variables constant. In this 
way, the results support the view that the IMF does not completely 
disregard its intended purpose by acting only in the interests of its most 
powerful members. But the economic determinants of IMF agreements tell 
only part of the story, as the results clearly indicate.  
Finally, the results strongly support the use of the Heckman selection model 
and the presence of selection effects in IMF lending. Firstly, the Wald test is 
reported for each model at the bottom of Tables 1. Based on the p-values 
from the tests, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the parameters 
of interest in the models are equal to zero, confirming the suitability of the 
model with these data. Secondly, Wald chi-squared tests of the 
independence of the selection and outcome equations are also reported for 
each model. These tests confirm that the errors in the first and second stage 
are correlated, indicating that Heckman’s procedure is appropriate here. 
Failing this, the results would be no different than those from separate 
probit and linear regression models. Finally, rho - the correlation coefficient 
between the unobserved factors that determine selection into an IMF 
program and the unobserved factors that determine the size of the IMF loan 
– is reported at the bottom of Table 1 for all models. The findings here also 
confirm the presence of selection effects as rho is significantly different 
from zero. It is difficult to interpret this value further, though, because the 
factors in the error should be impossible to measure and sensitive to model 
specification. In summary, these measures confirm the suitability of the 
Heckman selection model with these data and also confirm the presence of 
selection effects. This is an important finding because previous research on 
the factors that influence IMF loans find either little evidence of selection 
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effects (Copelovitch 2010) or do not correct for selection bias in the first 
place (Oatley and Yackee 2004).  
 
Robustness checks 
In the preceding section, I discussed the results from the Heckman selection 
models and demonstrated that G-5 economic exposure is a robust predictor 
of both loan size and program approval. In this section, I describe the 
various changes I made to the models and specifications in order to test if 
the results were robust to additional control variables and alternative 
measures of the key concepts and indicators.15 For all of the changes I 
describe here, the results were roughly comparable to the ones presented in 
the previous section, and are available on request.  
First, all of the specifications were replicated with an alternative dependent 
variable: IMF credit extended to country i at time t in millions of SDRs 
(logged). My selection of this variable was also motivated by its use in a 
previous study on IMF lending (Oatley and Yackee 2004).  
Second, I substituted G-5 bank exposure (as a percent of total bank lending) 
with bank exposure as a percent of GDP. This variable captures the 
exposure of the banking industry in the potential or actual recipient of IMF 
finance relative to the rest of the economy (rather than the rest of the 
sector) in each member of the G-5.  
Third, the models were replicated with UN-U.S. voting alignment in place of 
U.S. military aid. U.N.-U.S. voting is a dyadic measure of affinity between the 
U.S. and every other country computed using the S-score formula. Data are 
drawn from (Dreher and Sturm 2006; Voeten 2005). The logic underlying 
this choice of variable is that voting affinity should indicate whether a state 
is an ally of the United States. While U.S. military aid is a better measure of 
long-term strategic alliances, the former is widely used in the literature on 
IMF polices.  
Fourth, the models were replicated with a time trend to account for 
developments that I have not modelled such as increasing openness in trade 
and finance. A variable to capture a borrowing country’s previous 
relationship with the IMF was also included (number of programs in the 
previous 5 years).  
Fifth, a number of variables were included to account for the possibility that 
G-5 governments are responsive to domestic politics in the recipient, and 
that the recipient governments themselves might have some influence over 
the IMF’s lending process. The variables added to the base model, including 
G-5 bank exposure, were the number of veto players, a dummy for 
legislative and executive election years, and POLITY.  
Finally, I considered the possibility that the economic exposure of a larger 
group of states – the G-10 - matters when it comes to explaining IMF policy 
outcomes like loan size and program approval. Many different specifications 
showed little in the way of a systematic relationship between G-10 bank 
exposure and the likelihood of program approval or the size of an IMF loan. 
                                                 
15
 A number of standard tests reveal that the models do not suffer from 
multicollinearity or abnormally distributed residuals. I also used an 
alternative statistical method, employing OLS with panel-corrected standard 
errors to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and spatial correlation and a 
lagged dependent variable to account for temporal dependence and correct 
for serial correlation (Beck 2001). In addition, I controlled for selection bias 
by using propensity score matching. While these alternative models do not 
take account of the two-stage lending process, the results on loan size are in 
accord with those from the Heckman selection models.  
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The only exception was that German bank exposure was correlated with 
significantly higher loans on average. However, on the balance of evidence, 
G-5 exposure appears to be a much more robust predictor of loan size, as 
German trade and bank exposure among the G-5 is not statistically 
significant. The following variables were added to the base model with this 
possibility in mind: 
>Binary variables taking the value of ‘1’ where a member of the G-10 was 
the most exposed bank lender from amongst the group (the U.S., U.K., 
France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland)16.  
>Variables measuring the relative exposure (both individually taking the % 
of a country’s exposure relative to the rest of the G-10 and as a group) of 
Canada, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. 
In summary, the empirical analysis is robust to additional control variables, 
alternative measures of existing control variables, and alternative measures 
of the main explanatory variable, lending much support to my argument on 
the determinants of IMF lending.  
 
Conclusion 
While previous scholarship on IMF decision-making has stressed the 
importance of the United States and the Fund’s professional staff, the 
argument and findings presented here imply that the organization’s decisions 
are responsive to the interests of a larger group of states. The results from 
the Heckman selection models confirm that the benefits that flow from IMF 
lending are oversupplied where a member of the G-5 has closer trade and 
banking links with a developing or emerging market.  
The findings also have implications for our understanding of international 
cooperation. While conventional IR theory posits that states collaborate 
through IOs to share the gains from international cooperation (Keohane 
1984), the findings from my analysis suggests that in the case of high-level 
IMF decisions these gains are unevenly distributed. Rather, some of the 
gains from cooperation are distributed only among a smaller group of 
powerful states. This is not to say that the other members of the 
organization do not gain from other policies, but that when it comes to 
lending decisions that have significant distributional implications, we should 
be mindful of the distribution of power in the international system and 
within the organization itself.  
More generally, the findings have implications for our understanding of 
globalization and openness in the world economy. With the rapid increase in 
global transactions over the last number of years, many developing and 
emerging markets have increasingly integrated with other economies. This 
analysis suggests that the composition of their economic links matters for 
how they are treated by the international organizations that govern and 
regulate the world economy. According to my argument, countries can 
expect better treatment if they are more ‘centrally’ integrated with the 
world’s great economic powers, over those that are more regionally or 
heterogeneously integrated with other countries. 
Finally, the argument I have set out here also has consequences for how we 
view the IMF’s role in light of the global financial crisis. Recently, the G-20 
group of industrialized and emerging economies agreed to treble the IMF’s 
resources to $750 billion at their summit in 2009. Since the onset of the 
global crisis, we have also witnessed a surge in lending activity. Loans far 
exceeding normal limits were recently agreed with Mexico (31 billion SDRs), 
Hungary (10 billion SDRs), Romania (11 billion SDRs), Ukraine (11 billion 
SDRs), Poland (13 billion SDRs), and Iceland (1.4 billion SDRs). According 
                                                 
16
 The Netherlands was excluded as it was never the most exposed lender. 
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to my argument, this record-breaking surge in the IMF’s lending activity is 
partially driven by the demands of interest groups in the G-5 and logrolling 
at the IMF’s Executive Board. As governments (and policymakers) continue 
to disagree over how to respond to the global financial crisis, increasing the 
IMF’s capacity to respond was one of the few points of consensus. 
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Table 1: Heckman selection models: loan size and program approval 
 
LOAN / QUOTA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
G-5 bank exposure (log)  0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17***    
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)    
G-5 trade exposure (log)     0.19*** 0.15** 0.15** 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Reserves -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08** 0.01 -0.06* -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Current account 0.01 -0.02** -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
External debt 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.21* 0.25* 0.34** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Debt service 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP growth -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03** 0.00 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.16** -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Financial crisis   0.68*** 0.34**  0.77*** 0.73*** 
   (0.20) (0.16)  (0.23) (0.24) 
IMF quota review   0.05 -0.09  0.16 0.19 
   (0.15) (0.11)  (0.14) (0.14) 
IMF delegation index   0.01 0.07  -0.01 -0.03 
   (0.06) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) 
US military aid   0.00 0.00  0.00* 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Continued overleaf 
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PROGRAM APPROVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
G-5 bank exposure (log)  0.07*** 0.07** 0.07**    
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)    
G-5 trade exposure (log)     0.07** 0.08** 0.08** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Reserves -0.04** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.04* -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Current account 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
External debt -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Debt service 0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP growth -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Financial crisis   0.51*** 0.46***  0.54*** 0.49*** 
   (0.14) (0.14)  (0.14) (0.15) 
IMF quota review   0.11 0.13  0.18** 0.18* 
   (0.10) (0.11)  (0.09) (0.09) 
IMF delegation index   -0.03 -0.06  0.01 -0.02 
   (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) 
US military aid   -0.00 -0.00*  0.00 -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Systemic transition 0.60*** 0.43*** 0.38** 0.31 0.54*** 0.41** 0.26* 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.29) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) 
Observations 2181 1301 1069 1069 1694 1358 1358 
Censored 1777 1026 826 826 1408 1118 1118 
No. countries 118 105 101 101 118 117 117 
p.log likelihood -1459 -936 -796 -790 -1081 -876 -854 
Rho 0.89 0.92 0.91 -0.081 0.90 0.94 0.94 
Wald 33.2 51.6 70.3 56.9 33.5 61.1 85.0 
Wald indep. 33.9 48.3 23.0 0.23 31.7 64.9 66.8 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. Min. Max. N 
IMF loan (millions SDR) 579.15  2108.12 1.4 27375.1 535 
IMF loan / quota 1  1.4 0.05 19.38 535 
IMF program approval 0.14  0.35 0 1 3816 
G-5 trade exposure (%) 0  0.01 0 0.12 2536 
G-5 bank exposure (%) 0.01  0.03 0 0.28 2079 
Reserves (mts imports) 3.5  2.99 -0.09 32.13 2768 
Current account / GDP -4.15  10.7 -240.5 53.23 2817 
External debt / GDP 0.79  0.91 0 17.77 2545 
Debt service / GDP 5.52  5.33 0 107.37 2524 
GDP growth (%) 1.46  6.66 -50.49 90.07 3292 
GDP per capita (log) 7.11  1.29 4.03 10.47 3289 
IMF quota review 0.22  0.41 0 1 3657 
IMF delegation index 24.77  1.55  22.65     27.47 3657 
Financial crisis 0.07  0.26 0 1 3816 
US military aid (mil. USD) 15.13  130.17 0 5753.90 3233 
Systemic transition 0.02  0.13 0 1 3816 
 
 
 
Table 3: Data Appendix 
Variable Source 
IMF loan (millions SDR) International Financial Statistics 
IMF loan / quota International Financial Statistics 
IMF program approval International Monetary Fund 
G-5 trade exposure (%) IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics 
G-5 bank exposure (%) Bank for International Settlements 
Reserves (mts imports) World Development Indicators 
Current account / GDP World Development Indicators 
External debt / GDP World Development Indicators 
Debt service / GDP World Development Indicators 
GDP growth (%) World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita (log) World Development Indicators 
IMF quota review International Monetary Fund 
IMF delegation index (Brown 2009) 
Financial crisis (Laeven and Valencia 2008) 
US military aid (mil. USD) U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) 
Systemic transition Authors' 
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